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1.  Introduction 
 
Ever since the unprecedented terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (henceforth 9/11), 
economists have focused on myriad aspects of terrorism including its growth impact (Blomberg 
et al., 2004; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008, 2011; Tavares, 2004), its development consequences 
(Keefer and Loayza, 2008), its economic costs (e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Eckstein 
and Tsiddon, 2004), and its counterterrorism implications (e.g., Bandyopadhyay and Sandler, 
2011; Bier et al., 2007).  Researchers applied game-theoretic tools to investigate the practice of 
counterterrorism against domestic and transnational terrorism (see, e.g., Arce and Sandler, 2005; 
Bapat, 2006, 2011; Sandler et al., 1983).  Some contributions investigated the demand side in 
terms of the number and location of terrorist incidents (e.g., Sandler and Siqueira, 2006; Siqueira 
and Sandler, 2007), while other studies examined the supply side in terms of the roots of 
terrorism (e.g., Abadie, 2006; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Piazza, 2011; Savun and Phillips, 
2009).  Krueger and Laitin (2008) investigated both sides of terrorism by analyzing what 
determines whether a nation is a source or a target of transnational terrorism (see, also, Blomberg 
et al., 2009).  Another strand of the terrorism literature relates to trade and/or foreign direct 
investment (e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2011a; Enders and 
Sandler, 1996; Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004).  The empirical findings and methodology of the 
international trade and terrorism literature are nicely summarized by Mirza and Verdier (2008).  
In general, terrorism can curb trade and capital flows owing to heightened costs and risks. 
  Despite these contributions, there is no previous analysis that formally connects 
immigration policy in a developed country to the supply of terrorism from a developing country 
in a general equilibrium context.  This is an important omission because an exclusive focus on 
the standard terms-of-trade effects of immigration policy may result in misleading policy   2
recommendations.
1  The purpose of this paper is to fill this void by integrating immigration and 
counterterrorism policies in a strategic general equilibrium framework.  We show that terrorism-
related costs and/or benefits, along with terms-of-trade effects, are required when determining an 
optimal immigration policy.  There is a previously unrecognized interplay between proactive 
counterterrorism measures in a developing country and labor quotas in a developed country.  Our 
analysis can cast light on puzzles, such as why developing countries do not rid themselves of a 
resident transnational terrorist group when it poses a risk to their interests at home (Bapat, 2011).  
In particular, we identify circumstances where an unskilled labor-abundant developing country 
that hosts a terrorist group views skilled labor quotas abroad and its proactive counterterrorism 
measures as strategic substitutes.  Thus, the developing country will reduce its efforts to 
eradicate the resident terrorists when quotas in the developed country favor skilled laborers.  Our 
analysis addresses other puzzles, such as why a host country will, at times, employ proactive 
measures against its terrorists when more terrorism results.  These enhanced measures are 
desirable when national income increases as laborers return to the productive sector, which 
seemed to be the case in Saudi Arabia after its antiterrorist campaign in reaction to a series of al-
Qaida attacks in 2003–2005 on Western interests in the country. 
There is a small emerging empirical literature that comes to vastly divergent conclusions 
about the relationship between immigration and transnational terrorism.  In particular, studies 
that focused on known transnational terrorists showed that many were immigrants (e.g., Leiken 
and Brooke, 2006; Sageman, 2004), while a study that looked at immigrants in general did not 
find a significant relationship between immigration and terrorism (Dreher and Gassebner, 2010).  
Based on the World Values Survey on attitudes, Fischer (2011) found that immigrants are more 
                                                 
1 In this context, terms-of-trade effect refers to the wages of skilled or unskilled immigrants that the developed 
nation has to pay.  A fall in the immigrant’s wage is a terms-of-trade gain for the developed nation.      3
likely than natives to support the application of terrorism.  These mixed empirical results indicate 
that a theoretical analysis of the relationship between terrorism and immigration quotas imposed 
on the potential host country for terrorists may enlighten not only policymakers, but also 
empirical researchers. 
  In our theoretical framework, a transnational terrorist organization, based in a developing 
country, draws unskilled and skilled labor from the productive sector to attack targets at home 
and abroad.  These two types of laborers join the terrorist group when their anticipated gain 
exceeds that in the productive sector; this decision is influenced by wages, radicalization, and 
counterterrorism-induced risks of failure.  The ideal factor proportions differ between attacks at 
home and abroad.  Hitting targets abroad in a developed country needs a greater proportion of 
skilled to unskilled labor, compared with hitting targets at home.  This follows because attacks 
abroad require more complex logistics, language skills, reduced infrastructure, and traversing 
borders.  Given that attacks abroad are more skill-intensive than home attacks, we analyze the 
effects of counterterrorism policy as well as immigration policy on the supply of terrorism and 
on the national income of the two countries.  The host developing country applies proactive 
measures to annihilate the resident terrorists, while the targeted developed country relies on 
defensive measures to deflect attacks abroad.  As such, there are elements of positive and 
negative international externalities.  Our theoretical construct is descriptive of transnational 
terrorism in the post-Cold War era during which terrorist groups – e.g., al-Qaida, al-Qaida in the 
Arabian Peninsula, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jemaah Islamiyah – take refuge in developing countries 
(e.g., Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Indonesia), while attacking host and developed 
countries’ interests at home and abroad. 
  Given the diverse types of agents in our model (i.e., terrorist recruits, terrorist group, host 
developing country, and developed country) and the alternative policy instruments, the tradeoffs   4
are subtle and complex.  Among other results, we find that the developed country’s defensive 
efforts deflect attacks back to the host country.  When the terrorist organization’s unskilled labor 
to skilled labor ratio for terrorist attacks directed at the developed nation exceeds a critical 
threshold, proactive measures against the resident terrorist group must necessarily reduce the 
terrorism damage to the developed country, and increase such damage to the developing country.  
If, however, the critical threshold is between the unskilled to skilled labor ratios for terrorism 
directed at the two nations, proactive effort must reduce terrorism in both.  When the model is 
simplified with some reasonable parameters, we can identify the circumstances under which a 
developed country is eager or reticent to allow more skilled immigration from a host country to a 
terrorist group.  Generally, the developed country is more eager when its immigrant pool 
exercises a relatively small influence on facilitating terrorism there.  If, moreover, the developing 
country is abundant in unskilled labor, then the developed country gains by assuming a 
leadership role and chooses a smaller skilled labor quota.  This strategic action induces the 
developing country to engage in more proactive counterterrorism measures against its resident 
terrorists.  If, however, the host developing country is better endowed with skilled labor, then a 
larger skilled labor quota is the desired immigration policy.  Our specific cases indicate how 
relative labor endowments in the host developing country can inform immigration policies in the 
developed country for the terrorist-haven developing country.  Thus, how quotas should differ 
between skill-scarce Somalia and more skill-abundant Pakistan derives from our analysis. 
 
2.  The terrorist organization 
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups 
in order to obtain a political or social objective through intimidation of a large audience beyond 
that of the immediate victims (Enders and Sandler, 2012).  Terrorism is transnational when an   5
incident in one country involves perpetrators, victims, institutions, governments, or citizens of 
another country – e.g., 9/11 skyjackings.  In recent years, transnational terrorist groups often 
locate their base in a developing country from which they can attack Western interests at home 
or abroad.  Thus, Yemen, Lebanon, Somalia, Syria, Pakistan, Morocco, Algeria, Afghanistan, 
and other developing countries have been the base for many notorious terrorist groups (Hoffman, 
2006; Mickolus, 2008). 
  The underlying game has two to three stages.  In the first variant, the two governments 
choose their counterterrorism and immigration policies in the first stage, and the terrorist group 
decides its terrorist campaign in the second stage.  In the second variant, the developed country 
decides its counterterrorism and immigration policies in the first stage, followed by the 
developing country picking its proactive countermeasures in the second stage.  Finally, the 
terrorist group allocates its attacks at home and abroad in the third stage.  We solve both games 
backwards beginning with terrorist group’s decision in the final stage. 
The terrorist organization derives benefit from attacking targets in both the host 
developing nation (say, F) and the developed nation (say, H).  Along the lines of Mirza and 
Verdier (2008) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011b), the terrorist group’s utility function is 
  
* H HH F H F F F Vp T p T p T     ,                    (1) 
where 
j   is the terrorists’ preference for attacking nation j (=H, F); 
j p is the probability of 
success of a planned attack in nation j; 
*H T is terrorism damage in H; and 
F T is terrorism damage 
in nation F.
2  In Eq. (1), 
H T   is H’s terrorism damage from an attack in F, so that developed 
countries’ interests can be hit at home or abroad.  This accords with reality – e.g., very few 
                                                 
2 We assume that both economies produce the same single good, which serves as the numeraire in this model.  Also, 
the developed nation is assumed to have superior technology, which contributes to its factor returns being strictly 
larger than the corresponding factor returns in the developing nation.  This international factor price difference is 
possible (in equilibrium) because factor mobility is controlled by immigration quotas imposed by the developed 
nation.     6
attacks on US interests occur on US soil in recent years (Enders and Sandler, 2012).  As in 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011b), we assume that terror damage for H in F is
3 
 
H HF TT    ,                            (2)    
where 
H   is a parameter measuring the extent of H’s foreign interests in F.  The probability of 
success of a planned attack against H is lowered by its defensive actions, e, although at a 
diminishing rate, i.e., 
  
HH pp e  ,   0
H pe   , and   0
H pe   .                   (3) 
 Terrorist  attacks  targeted  in a developed nation from foreign bases require a higher 
degree of sophistication and are produced using a more skill-intensive technology.  However, 
both types of terrorism require a mix of unskilled and skilled labor and exhibit constant returns to 
scale (CRS).  The terrorism production functions in H and F are:
4 
    ,
H Ht Ht H TT L S    a n d                      ( 4 a )  
   ,
F F tF tF TT L S  ,                       ( 4 b )  
respectively, where 
tj L (
tj S ) is unskilled (skilled) labor used by the terrorists to attack targets in 
nation j.  We also assume without loss of generality that producing terrorism directed against H 
is more skill-intensive (i.e., 







 ,  , jH F  ).  A natural question is how is 
                                                 
3 We note a few things.  First, we assume that F has no foreign interests in H, so that attacks in H are attacks against 
H alone.  However, H has foreign interests in F that may be subject to terrorism attacks.   In principle, attacks in F 
against H’s or F’s interests may be separate.  Also, these attack technologies may be distinct, with different skill 
intensities.  If this is the case, then there are three skill intensities, high skill intensity for attacks in H, intermediate 
skill intensity for attacks against H in F, and low skill intensity for attacks against F.  Although this structure is 
reasonable, it is analytically intractable in this general equilibrium setup.  The compromise that we use is that an 
attack against F has a collateral damage component for H, which is weighted by its foreign interests in F.  For 
example, if the United States has extensive foreign interests in Pakistan, then US interests are more likely to be 
targeted in Pakistan than in the United States by Pakistan-based groups.    
4 These are standard constant returns to scale (CRS) production functions with positive marginal products 
j
i T , 
negative second-order partials ( 0
j
ii T  ) , and positive cross partials  ( 0
j
ix T  , ix  ).  Unless specified otherwise, 
we will use the standard subscript convention for partial derivatives.   7
the terrorism that is produced by a developing nation’s resources delivered in the developed 
nation?   Although cyber-attacks can be delivered remotely, more traditional terrorist attacks 
necessitate some physical presence in the target nation.  This may require participation by 
immigrants and/or tourists in the developed nation.  For tourist perpetrators, someone may 
acquire a temporary visa, visit the country, and carry out the attack without any local help, so 
that immigrants are not involved.  If, in contrast, the terrorist group’s attack is facilitated by an 
existing immigrant pool, then the effective terrorism (i.e.,
*H T ) in the developed nation depends 
on a sympathetic pool of skilled and unskilled immigrants.  A simple way to model this is as 
follows:    
   
* ,,












, and  0 A  ,            (5) 
where   and   are unskilled and skilled immigrant pools, respectively, in the developed nation.  
The partials of Aare non-negative because the presence of more skilled or unskilled immigrants 
potentially improves the delivery capability for terrorism in H.  Using Eqs. (1)-(5), we express 
the terrorist group’s expected utility as: 
 
H HF F VT T   ,      ,
HH H Ap e    , and   
FF H H F p     .                     (6) 
  Let the unskilled (skilled) labor supply be inelastically given for F at 
F L (
F S ).  We 
assume that H’s skilled and unskilled wages are sufficiently large relative to their counterparts in 
F, such that given an option to emigrate to H, a labor unit (skilled or unskilled) will choose to do 
so.  Thus, the immigration levels,   and  , equal the immigration quotas for unskilled and 
skilled immigration chosen by H.  The unskilled and skilled labor forces in F, net of emigrants, 
are 
F L   , and 
F S   , respectively. 
Each unit of unskilled labor has a certain level of radical beliefs, parameterized by 
u  ,   8
which means that if they succeed in working for the terrorist organization they get a utility 
equivalent to 
u  units of the numeraire good.  Even though units of unskilled labor are 
homogeneous as inputs in terrorism or in producing goods, they differ in their radical beliefs.  
The distribution of such beliefs is given by the following probability density and cumulative 
distribution functions, respectively: 
  





  .                      (7) 
All unskilled labor units in F earn 
uF w from the productive sector, which equals the marginal 
product of unskilled labor in producing goods.  When they volunteer for the terrorist 
organization, they know that there is a chance that they may not be able to serve effectively.  For 
example, they may be killed or incarcerated before being able to take part in an attack.  They are 
assumed to succeed in providing their services to the terrorist organization with a probability , 
which is a declining function of proactive effort m undertaken by the host government.  
Assuming diminishing returns in the use of such offensive action, we have 
   m   ,    0 m   , and    0 m   .                    (8) 
An unskilled labor unit stays in the productive sector if its wage exceeds it expected marginal 
return from being a terrorist: 
   
uF





  .                      (9) 
In keeping with the terrorist literature, we assume that the terrorist organization does not 
pay a wage to its volunteers, who join in order to contribute to the cause (e.g., Barrett, 2011; 
Sageman, 2004).  Volunteers’ underlying motive is often to rectify perceived grievances.  This is 
true for unskilled and skilled laborers who join terrorist groups.  Eq. (9) describes a margin that 
is similar to ones used in models of equilibrium migration, where a migrant equates the expected   9
return from migrating to that of the status quo.
5  Consider the decision faced by an illegal 
immigrant (e.g., Ethier, 1986).  If, say, someone stays home in Mexico, s/he earns a Mexican 
wage with certainty.  When, however, s/he attempts to migrate illegally to the United States, s/he 
may be caught and returned home after some penalties are imposed; or s/he may cross 
successfully and earn a higher wage.  The higher the probability of detection at the border and 
the greater the penalty, the less likely is the individual to migrate.  The analogy here is that 
higher proactive effort reduces the anticipated probability of success for a laborer contemplating 
a move to the terrorist sector.  The associated deterrence effect of proaction provides a more 
favorable allocation of labor for the productive sector, thereby bolstering national income.  Thus, 
the margin, described in Eq. (9), is critical and endogenous to policy choices.   









.  Thus,    1
F XL   labor units volunteer for the terrorist organization, 
of which a fraction   succeeds in providing their services in terrorist attacks.  Thus, the 
unskilled labor pool 
T L for the terrorist organization is 
      1, , ,
uF
TF T u F F w





        
.             (10) 
Similarly, let 
s  ,  
s g  , and  
s G  , be the radicalization parameter, the probability density 
function, and the cumulative distribution function for skilled labor, respectively.  Therefore, the 
skilled-labor pool for the terrorist organization is 
                                                 
5 The legal immigration quotas discussed in this paper are not based on an internal equilibrium relationship.  They 
arise from a corner solution where the migrant’s ex ante return from emigrating exceeds the return that can be 
obtained from staying back.  However, because immigration is controlled by quotas, this wedge in the returns is 
sustained in equilibrium.   10
      1, , ,
sF
TF T s F F w





        
.             (11)    
  The terrorist organization maximizes its utility [Eq. (6)], given its supply of skilled and 
unskilled labor [Eqs. (10)-(11)].  The constrained optimization problem for the terrorist 
organization is 
  Max     ,, , , ,
H Ht Ht H F Ft Ft F T u F F t H t F
L VT L S T L S L w m L L L            
                   ,, ,
T sF F tH tF
S Sw m SS S      ,                          (12)              
where  L   and  S   are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the unskilled and skilled labor 
constraints, respectively.  The first-order conditions (FOCs) yield the unskilled and skilled labor 
used by the terrorist organization in attacks at home and abroad and also the shadow prices (i.e., 
the optimal values of  L   and  S  ) of these resources for the terrorist organization.  Denoting the 
vector of parameters faced by the terrorist organization by  , we have 
  
tj tj LL   ,  
tj tj SS   ,  , jH F  ;    ii    ,  , iL S  , where 
   ,, , , , , ,,
H Fu F s F F F wwm L S     .                  (13) 
Substituting Eq. (13) into (12), we have the envelope function 
* V :  
  
**,; , , , , ,,
H Fu F s F F F VV w w m L S    .                  (14) 




1 ,; , , , , ,,
H HF u Fs F FF TV w w m L S      and            (15a) 
  
*
2 ,; , , , , ,,
FH Fu F s F F F TV w w m L S    .               (15b)   11
It is easy to show that 
* V  is convex and homogeneous of degree one in 




Proposition 1:  A rise in H’s counterterrorism defense effort (e) reduces terrorism against it 
while raising the terrorism directed at F. 
Proof 













.                    (16) 
Given that 
HH H Ap e   , we have 
 
*









            
.            (17) 
Because 
* V is homogeneous to degree one, the first-order partial 
*
1 V  is homogeneous of degree 
zero in
H   and 
F  .  Using Euler’s theorem and Eq. (16), we get 
 
** * * * *










      

.      (18a) 










      
.                 (18b)   
Eqs. (17) and (18b) establish the proposition. ■ 
 
Proposition 1 confirms the terrorism reduction versus terrorism deflection consequence of 
defensive measures that dates back to Lapan and Sandler (1988) (see also Bandyopadhyay and 
                                                 
6 
* V is similar to the revenue function used in dual models of trade (see Dixit and Norman, 1980).  The proofs of 
convexity and homogeneity are standard and are available from the authors on request. 
7 Proof is in the Appendix.   12
Sandler, 2011; Bier et al., 2007; Intriligator, 2010; Sandler and Siqueira, 2006).  This proposition 
shows that a general equilibrium framework preserves this result.  H’s defensive actions reduce 
the likelihood of successful terrorist incidents in H, thereby deflecting them back to the host 
country F.  Although H’s homeland is now safer for its actions, its interest can still be hit abroad 
– e.g., attacks against US people or property in Pakistan.  Thus, country H must weigh these 
losses against the gains from reduced attacks on its homeland when coming up with an optimal 
defense policy (see Section 4).  Homeland attacks are typically more damaging than foreign 
attacks on its interests.  Recent empirical studies showed a marked shift in terrorist attacks from 
developed to developing countries following 9/11-motivated security increases (Enders and 
Sandler, 2006, 2012).  Developed countries’ interests were more frequently targeted abroad.   
We now turn our attention to the effects of proactive policies in the developing country 
hosting the terrorists.  The effect of a rise in proactive measures m  on 












.                       ( 1 9 )  
Using the envelope property of 












.                      ( 2 0 )  
Differentiating Eqs. (10) and (11), respectively, yields 









          










          
.                (21) 
Eq. (21) shows that proactive effort must reduce both the unskilled and the skilled labor 
resources of the terrorist group for two reasons.  First, a rise in proactive effort depletes the   13
group’s labor resources for a given labor allocation between the productive and terrorist sectors.  
Second, as proaction rises, the ex ante return from joining the terrorist organization must fall [Eq. 
(9) above], so that fewer laborers become terrorists.  This effect complements the direct effect of 
proaction, leading to fewer terrorists.   










    
.                    (22) 
In the Appendix, we show that 










   










    
.              (23) 
From Eq. (12), 
H  is the marginal return of 
H T  for the terrorist organization.  A rise in this 
return makes the terrorists produce relatively more of this type of terrorism, so that 
H T expands, 
thus requiring more skilled relative to unskilled labor.  To supply these additional resources, 
terrorists must contract unskill-intensive 
F T , which releases relatively more unskilled  labor.  
The result is an excess supply of unskilled labor and an excess demand of skilled labor, which 
leads to a fall in the shadow price of unskilled labor (i.e., L  ) and a rise in the shadow price of 
skilled labor (i.e., S  ).     





is ambiguous.  Proposition 2 
throws light on this ambiguity. 
 
Proposition 2:  A small rise in F’s proactive effort will reduce terrorism in H if and only if 
tF l  
exceeds a critical level 
0 l .  This critical level depends on the initial proactive level, H’s 
immigration quotas, F’s factor endowments and factor prices, and the probability density   14
functions x and g.  Terrorism in F will fall if and only if 
tH l is less than the critical value 
0 l .  It is 
not, however, possible for terrorism to rise in both nations.   
Proof 
Given Eqs. (19)-(23), we show in the Appendix that 
*
0 implies that  0






 if and only if 




,, , ,, ,
1
uF T F
uF sF F F m
TF s F
m
Xx w L L





   
        
.                   (24) 







 if and only if 
0 tH ll  .                    (25) 
From the terrorist organization’s FOCs, terrorism labor intensities are entirely determined by 
H   
and 
F  .  Different possibilities arise depending on these two parameters.  We can rule out the 










 are positive, because it requires that 
0 tF ll   and 
0 tH ll  in 
violation of the assumed factor intensity ranking 
tH tF ll  .  Based on Eqs. (24)-(25), three cases 
are possible: 















0 tF ll  , 
0 tH ll  . 















0 tF ll  , 
0 tH ll  . 















0 tF tH ll l  . 
Cases 1 through 3 establish the proposition. ■  
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  From Eq. (21), we know that a rise in proactive effort reduces both the unskilled and 
skilled labor resources of the terrorist group; however, this does not imply that terrorism must 
fall in both nations.  To see why this is the case, consider a situation where 
T
m S  tends to zero, 
while
T
m L  is nonzero and finite, which ensures that 
0 l is arbitrarily large and must exceed both  
tH l  and 
tF l (i.e., Case 1).  Proactive measures reduce the terrorist organization’s unskilled 
resources, but has a negligible effect on its skilled resources (because  0
T
m S  ).  The relative 
scarcity of unskilled resources makes the terrorist group scale back 
F T , which releases some 
skilled labor in the process.  If this excess supply of skilled labor is exactly offset by the 
reduction in skilled resources due to proactive effort, then there is no unemployment of skilled 
resources.  However, given that 
T
m S  is arbitrarily small, this excess supply cannot be neutralized.  
The only way for these resources to be fully utilized is to scale up the production of 
H T (and 
hence the supply of 
*H T ).  The opposite redistribution of labor happens in Case 2.  In Case 3, as 
unskilled resources decline, the terrorist group scales back 
F T , releasing some skilled labor.  
This excess supply of skilled labor is more than offset by the decline in skilled labor due to 
proactive measures (i.e., 
T
m S  is sufficiently large).  The result is a shortage of skilled labor, which 
is resolved by scaling down 
H T .  Thus, the terrorist group’s ability to circumvent F’s 
countermeasures through a change in the mix of terrorism is more limited, so that terrorism 
directed at both F and H declines.  
 
2.1. An example with specific functional forms 
Let us assume that the probability density functions x and g are independently, identically, and 

















 .               (26)   













.                        ( 2 7 )    
For the terrorist organization to produce both 
H T and 
F T , their unskilled to skilled endowment 








 .                      ( 2 8 )  
Substituting for 
T L  and 
T S based on Eqs. (10)-(11) and (26), we have 
 












sFu F ww  .          (29) 
Eq. (29) immediately rules out Case 1 where 
0 tF ll  .  Case 2 requires that 
0 tF tH lll  , which is 
satisfied for 
tF l , but not necessarily for 
tH l .  Because  exceeds unity, it is possible that 
 
00 tH ll l  .                        ( 3 0 )  
If Eqs. (29) and (30) are simultaneously satisfied, we have Case 2.  To obtain an explicit range of 
parameters for this case, we use the following Cobb-Douglas production functions: 
   
1 Ft F t F TLS
  
 ,    
1 Ht Ht H TLS
  
 ,                  (31) 
where     to ensure that 
tF tH ll  .  For simplicity, we assume that  1 A  , 1
F p  , and 
0
H   .
















           
.              (32) 
Since  exceeds unity and  exceeds  , 
  
 is larger than unity.  Also, from Eq. (29), the 
                                                 
8 This set of assumptions is not crucial, but allows the reader to focus on a parameter range that is easier to visualize.   17
larger is the skilled wage and the smaller is the unskilled wage in F, the larger is  .  This then 





.  Turning to Case 3, we find the 
permissible range that satisfies Eq. (29) to be 
 
00 tH tF ll l l   .                         ( 3 3 )  

















             
.              (34)  
The smaller is  , and the larger is   relative to  , the larger is the range identified by Eq. (34).  
If  is close to unity, Case 3 is more likely than Case 2, because the range represented by Eq. 
(32) is small, while that represented by Eq. (34) is correspondingly large.  The opposite happens 
if  is large.   
 
Proposition 3:  A rise in the terrorist group’s target preference for H raises 
*H T and lowers 
F T .  
An increase in the unskilled immigration quota   raises 
*H T and reduces 
F T .  However, a rise 
in the skilled immigration quota   may or may not raise 
*H T  and 
F T .  If skilled immigration 
has a sufficiently small marginal impact on the delivery of terrorism in H (i.e., if  A is small), a 
rise in the skilled immigration quota reduces 
*H T  and increases 
F T .  A sufficient condition for 
this to occur is for skilled immigrants to have no marginal effect in facilitating the delivery of 
terror in the developed country (i.e.,  0 A  ). 
Proof 
The proof is in the Appendix. ■   
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  A greater target preference for H makes the terrorists devote more of their resources to 
attacking H, which leaves fewer resources for attacks on F.  Thus, when terrorists fixate on H, 
*H T rises and 
F T falls.  The effect of immigration quotas is more complicated.  When 
 increases, it raises A and makes it easier to deliver terrorism in H.  This creates a greater 
incentive for the terrorist group to perpetrate terrorism in H.  The net supply of unskilled labor in 
F (i.e., 
F L   ) is also reduced, which decreases the relative supply of unskilled labor for the 
terrorist group [see Eq. (10)].  This then results in a rise in the supply of skill-intensive terrorism 
*H T  and a reduction in the supply of unskill-intensive terrorism 
F T .  Both the terrorism-delivery 
facilitation and the factor-intensity effect suggest that a rise in unskilled immigration must 
augment terrorism in H and reduce it in F.  When, however, we consider the skilled immigration 
quota, we encounter two opposing effects.  On the one hand, a greater pool of skilled immigrants 
facilitates terrorism delivery in H, which tends to raise 
*H T and reduce 
F T .  On the other hand, a 
reduction in the relative availability of skilled laborers due to emigration in F reduces S
T [see Eq. 
(11)], which limits skill-intensive 
*H T and augments unskill-intensive 
F T .  Thus, the net effect 
of an increase in the skilled immigration quota on both 
*H T and T
F is ambiguous.  However, as 
shown in the Appendix, if the effect of skilled immigration in facilitating terror delivery ( A ) is 
sufficiently small, then the resource reallocation effects in F dominate, and terrorism must fall in 
H and rise in F.  Indeed, this must occur if  0 A  .
9   
 
3.  The host (developing) government 
                                                 
9 If  A
 is positive, then it has to be below a strictly positive threshold identified in the Appendix, for terrorism to fall 
in H and also to rise in F.  This threshold depends on terrorism production functions and the terrorist organization’s 
resource endowments in a complicated way.  Although the level of A affects this threshold, A’s partials do not.  
Thus, for any set of production side parameters in F, one can identify functions    , A   , such that  A
 is below this 
threshold.   19
In stage 2, F’s government decides its proactive measures against the resident terrorist group.  
We assume that F produces a single good, 
F Q , using the following CRS production function: 
   ,
FF F F QL S   ,                                  (35) 
where 
F L  and 
F S are unskilled and skilled labor used in the production of this good.  Recalling 
that X is the share of unskilled labor engaged in productive activity in F, we have
10 
  
FF LL X   ,                               (36a) 
and, similarly, 
  
FF SS G   .                                (36b) 
F’s national income, including the earnings of its emigrants and net of terrorism damage, T
F, and 
counterterrorism spending, is 
    ,
FFF F u H s H F YL X S G w w T m             ,                                (37) 
where 
uH w and 
sH w are the unskilled and skilled wage rates, respectively, in H.  In Eq. (37), the 
price of proactive measures is normalized to be 1.   
We assume that H’s CRS production function is 
 ,
H HHH QL S   .                                  (38) 
Accounting for the immigrants in H’s labor pool, we obtain 
 
HH LL   and 
HH SS  .                              (39) 
The wage rates in the two nations reflect their respective marginal products.  Suppressing the 
factor endowments in the functional forms, we have 
     1 ,1
uH H H uH H wi w i   ,      2 ,1
sH H H sH H wi w i   ,     1 ,1
uF F F uF F wi w i   , and 
                                                 
10 We assume that emigration is neutral in terms of affecting the probability distributions of radicalization in F’s 
population of skilled and unskilled labor.  Thus, a reduction of the unskilled (skilled) labor pool through emigration 
does not affect the fraction X (G).     20
     2 ,1
sFF F s F F wi w i   , where 









































.                                      (40) 
Eq. (40) reflects that homogeneity of degree one of the production functions in both 
nations makes the marginal products and, hence, the factor returns determined entirely by the 
unskilled labor intensity   ,
j ijH F  .  In equilibrium, the unskilled labor intensities reflect the 
relative abundance of the unskilled labor available in the two nations for productive activities.  
Clearly, immigration affects this abundance by making more labor available to H at the expense 
of country F.  For example, a rise in unskilled immigration raises the unskilled labor intensity in 
H and reduces it in F.  This then reduces the marginal product of unskilled labor and its wage in 
H.  In contrast, a rise in H’s unskilled labor intensity raises its marginal product of skilled labor 
and, hence, its skilled wage.  For the same reasons, emigration from F must move its wages in 
precisely the opposite direction.  Finally, proactive effort can affect the wages in F but not in H.  
Wages in H are unaffected because 
H i is entirely determined by the immigration quotas and H’s 
existing labor stocks, so that proactive measures have no direct effect on it.  In contrast, 
increased proactive measures deplete both types of labor in F [see Eq. (21)], possibly changing 
F i and wages in F.  When, however, the proactive response reduces the availability of skilled and 
unskilled labor in the same proportion, their relative abundance in F is unchanged, so that F’s 
wages are unaffected.  This issue is addressed below.             
Country F takes H’s immigration quotas (  and  ) as given when choosing its national-  21
income-maximizing proactive effort.
11  In light of Eq. (40) this fixes 
H i and, hence, the skilled 
and unskilled wages in H in terms of F’s decision making.    Differentiating Eq. (37), we obtain 
the FOC for F’s income-maximizing proactive effort: 
     12 ;, , 1 0
F F
FF F F F
m
YX G T
Ym e L S
mm m m
    
                  
.           (41a) 
Eq. (41a) implicitly defines F’s Nash reaction function as 
   ,, mm e    .                                   (41b) 










                 
.                                      (42) 







 if and only if 




















 ,                           (43) 
where 
X  and 
G   are the elasticity of the distribution functions X and G with respect to the 
radicalization parameters 
u   and 
s  , respectively.  The intuition behind Eq. (43) is 
straightforward.  Proactive measures reduce the returns from joining the terrorist group for both 
skilled and unskilled volunteers [see Eqs. (9)-(11)].  Thus, the proportions of skilled and 
unskilled labor (i.e., G and  X , respectively) that join the productive sector must both rise.  If 
X  exceeds 
G  , the proportion  X  rises faster than the proportion G .  In the light of Eq. (40) 
this suggests that 
F i  must rise.  If the elasticities are equal (as in the specific functional forms for 
the probability distributions we use below),  X  and G  rise at the same rate, and 
F i does not 
change.  Consequently, wages in F do not change.  For simplicity, we henceforth assume that the 
                                                 
11 This is consistent with two scenarios:  H and F simultaneously choosing their income-maximizing policies; and H 
choosing its policy at an earlier stage compared to F.  We analyze both scenarios.   22
probability density functions are of the form described in Eq. (26) above.
12  Using Eq. (26) and 
the definitions of 
X   and 
G  from (43), we get 








.                    (44) 
Substituting Eq. (44) into (42), we have 








.                                (45a) 
Similarly, we get 








.                                (45b) 
 
Proposition 4:  Nation F chooses its proactive response to reduce its terrorism damages and also 
to benefit from bringing more of its resources from the terrorist sector into the productive sector.  
Even when proactive effort raises terrorism in F, the government may still choose to employ it.     
Proof 
Given Eq. (40), we can write Eq. (41a) as 
    1
F




            
.                         (46) 
The proposition is established from Eq. (46) in light of  Eqs. (45a)-(45b) and Proposition 2. ■ 
 





in Eq. (45a) reflects the rise in the proportion of productive unskilled 
labor in F as greater proactive measures dissuade some potential terrorist volunteers.  The 
                                                 
12 From Eq. (44), this assumption allows us to focus on the simplest of the three possible cases in Eq. (43), where 
X G    .  Most of the tradeoffs faced by the governments then come out cleanly.  While it is possible to analyze the 
other two cases (i.e., 
XG    , and 
XG    ),  we choose not to do so in this paper for clarity of exposition and 
space considerations.     23
ensuing rise in output in F is captured by the first term of Eq. (46).  Similarly, the second term in 
(46) reflects the corresponding rise in output from the return of skilled labor to productive 
activities.  Based on Proposition 2, proactive effort may, however, increase 
F T .  Even then, 
national income may increase as long as the first two terms in Eq. (46) dominate (starting from 
0 m  ).  This is a general equilibrium result, novel to this literature.  This finding indicates that 
the deterrence effect, which keeps more of the population away from terrorism, may be an 
important determinant of national-income-maximizing counterterrorism policy.  It can rationalize 
the apparently counterintuitive behavior of governments that continue to engage in proactive 
counterterrorism policies, despite a rise in terrorist attacks due to such policies.   Following al-
Qaida suicide terrorist attacks on Western residential compounds and other attacks on Saudi oil 
infrastructure during 2003–2005, Saudi Arabia took a firm proactive stance against terrorism to 
preserve its income, even though the stance initially resulted in more terrorist attacks 
(Economist.com, 2008).  Such attacks are known as backlash stemming from counterterrorism-
induced grievances (Bloom, 2005; Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004; Siqueira and Sandler, 2007).  
A similar scenario characterized Pakistan following 9/11 and Iraq following the 2007 US 
military surge.   
 
4.  The developed country’s government policy choices 
Based on Eqs. (38)-(40), H’s national income, net of immigrant earnings, terrorism damages, and 
counterterrorism expenditure, is
13 
   
* ,
HH H H u H s H H HH YL Sw w p e T T e             
 ,                    (47a) 
where the price of defensive effort is normalized at 1.  Using Eqs. (2) and (5), we have 
                                                 
13 Omitting immigrant incomes from the host nation’s objective function is a debatable issue.  However, for lack of 
an unambiguously superior alternative, this approach is standard and is used widely in the trade-immigration 
literature (e.g., see Ethier, 1986).     24
      ,,
HH H H u H s H H HH F YL Sw w p e A T T e                 .               (47b) 
We consider two scenarios – Nash and Stackelberg – for H’s choice of its national-income-
maximizing combination of defense and immigration policies.   
  
4.1.  Nash equilibrium 
We have already described the policy choice rule for F where it assumes H’s policies to be given 
when choosing its income-maximizing proactive level.  Under the Nash assumption, H takes m 
as given while choosing its income-maximizing policy variables.  The resulting equilibrium is a 
Nash policy equilibrium.  Using Eq. (40), we differentiate Eq. (47b) to obtain H’s FOCs for 









               
,                                 (48a) 
   0




ip A T A   
  
      
               
, and       (48b) 
   0




ip A T A   
  
      
               
.                  (48c)  
For given levels of the immigration quotas, we see that 
H i , 
uH w , and 
sH w are all fixed – 
see Eq. (40).  Thus, defense cannot affect the first three terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (47b).  
Its effect on H’s national income is through the expected terrorism damages in H and F and from 
its budgetary cost.  Using Proposition 1, we know that defense reduces terrorism in H and raises 
terrorism in F through transference of attacks.  Thus, Eq. (48a) suggests that the benefit from 
terrorism reduction at home has to be balanced against the damages on H’s foreign interests in F, 
as well as against the direct budgetary cost of defense.  Turning to Eq. (48b), we see that if the   25
unskilled labor intensity of the immigrant pool (i.e.,  /   ) is larger than the corresponding 
intensity in production 
H i , then unskilled immigration confers terms-of-trade benefits that must 
be weighed against costs from increased terrorism.  When  /   is large, the unskilled wage 
reduction from a relaxation of  confers benefits to H because it has to pay a lower amount to 
the large existing pool of unskilled immigrants.  However, from Proposition 3, we know that 
 augments terror in H while reducing it in F.  These terrorism-related benefits and costs have to 
be weighed against the terms-of-trade benefits to optimally choose the unskilled immigration 
quota.  The tradeoffs for skilled immigration quota are similar, except that both the terms-of-
trade and the terrorism-related effects work in the opposite direction.    
 
4.1.1.  Comparative statics of Nash equilibrium in a reduced model 
The Nash equilibrium, defined by Eqs. (41a) and (48a)-(48c), is intractable for conducting 
comparative statics.  In this subsection, we use a reduced model where defense and unskilled 
immigration  are given exogenously, and    ,1 A  .  For simplicity, we normalize the given 
unskilled immigration level at zero.  Eq. (48c) then reduces to: 
   ,0
uH H F
HH H H wTT





.                (49) 
Eq. (49) implicitly indicates the Nash reaction function of H, and together with Eq. (41a) for the 
Nash reaction path of F, determines the Nash equilibrium levels of m  and  .  In the rest of the 
analysis, for tractability, we use the earlier Cobb-Douglas functional forms for 
H T and 
F T , and 
also apply the following functional forms for Eqs. (35) and (38): 
      
1
,
kk FF F F F F QL S L S 

  and                 (50) 
      
1
,
zz HH H H H H QL S L S 

 .                    (51)   26
Lemma 1: F’s reaction function is downward sloping (i.e.  0
F
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                


















    

.             (52) 
Proof 
Note that because defense is held constant, 
H p is given, and hence 
tF l is determined entirely by 
parameters involving the terrorist organization and nation H.  Thus, the second inequality 
involves parameters except for  and  .  The probability  is bounded between zero and unity, 
while  has to be between zero and 
F S .  If  approaches zero, or   approaches 
F S , then the 
inequality is necessarily satisfied.  If, however,  1    and  0   , the inequality may still be 
satisfied as long as the other terms on the left-hand side are sufficiently large.  The first 
inequality in (52) suggests that given Cobb-Douglas parameters and  , the inequality is more 
likely to be satisfied if the skilled wage in F is high.  The second inequality reflects the 
determinants of this skilled wage (derived using the specific functional forms), and reflects the 





is high), then the inequality is more likely to be 
satisfied. ■   
 
The intuition is as follows.  F’s proactive efforts benefit it by encouraging more of its skilled 
workers to move to the productive sector.  If skilled emigration ( ) increases, then F loses a 
                                                 
14 The derivation of Eq. (52) is provided in the Appendix.  Derivations supporting the rest of this subsection are 
available on request.   27
potential skilled worker, who could have been moved from terrorism to productive work.  This 
loss is even greater when the worker possesses a high marginal product (i.e., 
sF w is high), thus 
reducing the incentive for F to use proactive effort.  In other words,  0
F
m Y   , so that proactive 
measures and the skilled-labor quota in the developed country are strategic substitutes.  This 
suggests that a skill-scarce terrorist haven, such as Yemen or Somalia, would be more reluctant 
than a more skill-abundant haven, such as Pakistan, to engage in a proactive campaign. 
 
Lemma 2  H’s reaction function is downward sloping (i.e.,  0
H
m Y  ), if and only if 
 
H HH F
mm p TT    , where  0
H
m T   and  0
F
m T   .               (53) 
First consider why  0
H
m T  .  A rise in  reduces terrorism in H.  This fall in terrorism is 
proportional to the fraction of skilled labor employed by the terrorist sector.  When m rises, this 
proportion is lower, scaling down the marginal terrorism reduction from  (i.e.,  0
H
m T  ).  The 
term  
F
m T  is negative for a similar reason.  If the home effect 
H H
m p T is larger than the foreign-
interest effect (i.e., 
H F
m T   ), then H’s reaction function is downward sloping. ■ 
 
Using the second order conditions  0
H Y  , and  0
F
mm Y  , and the Nash stability condition,  
0
HF HF




 if and only if  0
F








  if and only if  0
F




 .              (54b) 
The intuition behind Eq. (54a) is that with a larger unskilled endowment for H, the terms-of-  28
trade gains from having more skilled immigration is larger.   This encourages a higher  , 
shifting out H’s reaction function.  While  rises, m  rises or falls in the new Nash equilibrium 
depending on whether F’s reaction function is positively or negatively sloped.  Similar intuition 
applies to Eq. (54b).  Turning to F’s endowments, we have 
  0 F
dm
dL




 if  0
F
m Y   ,  0
H
m Y  , and 
tH tF ll   ,  











;                     ( 5 5 a )  
  0 F
dm
dS




 if  0
F
m Y   , 0
H
m Y  , and 
tH tF ll   .                    (55b) 
The intuition for the comparative statics of changes in F’s endowments is more complicated 
(compared to H’s) because both nations’ reaction functions shift in this case.  When unskilled 
labor endowment in F rises, proaction’s gains from bringing more people into the productive 
sector, as well as the terror reduction effect on 
F T , are amplified.  This leads to a shifting out of 
F’s reaction function.  If, on the other hand, the terrorism factor intensities are within the range 
above, the terrorism-reduction gains from skilled immigration is reduced by 
F L through its 
effects on wages in F.  This shifts H’s reaction function inward.  Thus, when both reaction 
functions are downward sloping, the final Nash equilibrium involves a higher proactive measure 
and a lower skilled immigration level.  The intuition for a change in F’s skilled labor is similar.      
 
4.2.  Stackelberg equilibrium in the reduced model 
This subsection describes the Stackelberg equilibrium in which H chooses its policy one stage 
ahead of F, so that the underlying game has three stages.  For simplicity, we use the reduced 
model used in the previous subsection.  To analyze the Stackelberg equilibrium, we write Eq.   29
(47b) for the reduced model as 
   ,
HH YY m   .                   ( 5 6 a )  
Using (41b), we can write (56a) to represent the payoff of H from being a Stackelberg leader, as 
   ,
HL H YY m      ,                       (56b) 






     
          
.                  (57) 
Eq. (40) indicates that, for given   and  , 
H i is given and is not affected by m; hence, 
uH w  and 
sH w cannot be directly affected by m .  By differentiating (47b) (for given e,   and  ) with 








      
,                  (58) 
using Case 3 of Proposition 2 (i.e., both 
H T and 
F T decline with proactive measures).  Recall that 
Case 1 is ruled for our specific functional forms.  Case 2 can potentially lead to ambiguity in the 






   
] dominates.   
 
Proposition 5:  H’s leadership choice of its skilled immigration quota is lower than the Nash 
level when F is sufficiently unskilled labor abundant.   
Proof 
If we evaluate the marginal leadership payoff at the Nash equilibrium, then the first term on the 






     
          





   
.             (59) 
Based on Eq. (52), it is clear that because  1   , and 0
F S   , the following condition is 
















    

.          ( 6 0 )  








   
, where 
L  and 
N   are the 
leadership and Nash levels of the skilled immigration quota, respectively. ■ 
 
The intuition for Proposition 5 follows from our discussion after Lemma 1.  When F is 





is large), it has a high skilled wage.  In this situation, 
losing skilled labor (through emigration) reduces F’s incentive for proaction.  As a Stackelberg 
leader, H recognizes this fact, and holds back its skilled immigration quota appropriately.     
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
Immigration and counterterrorism policies are both central concerns confronting the United 
States and many other terrorist-targeted developed countries.  Moreover, consistent with our 
model, numerous transnational terrorist groups have taken up residency in developing countries 
with limited capabilities to root out the groups.  This paper is the first general equilibrium 
analysis with strategic aspects that investigates the interrelationship between immigration quotas 
and the choice between defensive countermeasures in the developed country and proactive 
measures in the (host) developing country.     31
Even though the analysis is complex and ambiguous in places, there are many important 
and unambiguous insights, especially when specific functional forms are assumed.  First, 
developed countries gain from deflecting attacks back to the developing country despite its own 
interests in the latter.  Second, proactive measures against a resident terrorist group need not 
reduce terrorism at home and abroad.  This is a novel result that hinges on labor-intensity 
considerations in the productive and terrorist sectors in the host developing country and abroad 
in the developed country.  In contrast, the literature views such proactive measures as necessarily 
reducing terrorism everywhere (e.g., Sandler and Siqueira, 2006).  Third, the host country for 
terrorism may be better off in augmenting proactive measures even if this leads to more attacks 
at home.  This follows when such measures more than compensate for the additional terrorism by 
augmenting the labor supply in the productive sector so that national income rises.  Fourth, we 
show that a larger unskilled immigration quota raises terrorism against the developed country, 
while it reduces terrorism against the developing country.  If the skilled migrant pool has a 
limited marginal impact on producing terrorism in the developed country, then a greater skilled 
labor quota reduces terrorism in the developed country but raises terrorism in the developing 
country.  Fifth, we identify the circumstances for a reduced model where the developed country 
can gain a strategic advantage through policy leadership.  When proactive measures and skilled 
quotas are strategic substitutes, reduced skilled immigration quotas by the developed country 
shift the burden of the war on terror to the developing country.  Other scenarios would 
characterize strategic complements.  Sixth, we establish that optimal immigration or 
counterterrorism policies cannot be examined in isolation; thus, there are firm theoretical 
grounds for including US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Department of 
Homeland Security.  That is, the margins affecting immigration choices can be greatly 
influenced by counterterrorism policies at home and abroad.  32
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Appendix  
1.  Derivation of Eq. (16) 
Using the terrorist organization’s FOCs, we have  
    11 ,1 ,1 0
H H tH F F tF Tl Tl     a n d               ( M 1 )  
    22 ,1 ,1 0
H H tH F F tF Tl Tl   .               ( M 2 )  

































.             (M3) 
We can write the terrorist group’s unskilled labor constraint as: 
   ,, ,
tH tH tF tF T uH H lS lS L w m L   .                 ( M 4 )  

















, because  
tF tH ll  .            (M5) 
Using Eq. (4a), we have 
     1 ,1 ,1 ,1 0
Ht H t H
H t HH t H H t H t HH t H
HH H
TS l
T S Tl Tl S Tl
 
 
   
 
.        (M6) 
 
2.  Derivation of Eq. (23): 
Differentiating the Lagrangian multipliers by using the terrorist organization’s FOCs, we get Eq. 
(23). 
 
3.  Derivation of Eqs. (24) and (25):   38





















   
 
  
.                  ( M 7 )  
We first substitute the expressions for 
T
m L and 
T
























  [see Eq. (24)].  Given the 
homogeneity of degree zero of   1 ,1
Ft F Tl  and Euler’s theorem, we can reduce (M7) to show that: 







0 tF ll  .                     ( M 8 )  
Analogously, we get Eq. (25): 
 
4.  Proof of Proposition 3: 























.                  ( M 9 )  
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
    
 
   
  
.           ( M 1 0 )  
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    
.             ( M 1 2 )  






 .  Using the envelope theorem and Eq. (12), we get 
* V .  
Differentiating 
* V  , we can then show that 
*
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.               ( M 1 3 )  










.  Using a method similar to above, we can show that 
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 by (M13).   
 (e)  Differentiating 
*H T , using Eq. (6), and the fact that 
*
1 V is 

























.                           (M14) 
Using the envelope theorem and Eqs. (11)-(12), we obtain 
* V  and, in turn, 
*
1 0 V   .   Based on 





is ambiguous in general, and is negative if  
A  is sufficiently small.  A sufficient condition for this latter case is where skilled immigration 
has no effect in the facilitation of terror delivery (i.e., if  0 A  ).       40


















 .          ( M 1 5 )  
Based on methods similar to above, we can show that 
*





is ambiguous, but is positive if  A is sufficiently small.  It is clear from Eqs. (M14) and 















.  A sufficient condition for this to occur is  0 A  . 
 
5.  Derivation of  Eq. (43): 
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FF F sF uF
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      
                
.       (M16) 







 iff  0 i N  , i.e., iff       0
sF F F uF F gw i S xw L     .         (M17) 








 .  Substituting this last expression in Eq. 
(M17) and simplifying, we get Eq. (43).   
   41
6.  Deriving H’s policy rules [Eqs. (48a) through (48c)]: 
(a)  Derivation of Eq. (48a): 
Eq. (40) indicates that   ,
H i    is independent of e.  In turn,   
uH H wi and  
sHH wi are 
independent of e. Differentiation of Eq. (47b) with respect to eimmediately yields Eq. (48a). 
(b)  Derivation of Eq. (48b): 
Differentiating Eq. (47b) and using  1
uH H w   , we have 
 
H uH sH H F
HH H Yw w T T
pT A A   
   
     
            
.                  (M18) 
Using Eq. (40) and the homogeneity of degree zero of    1









.                              (M19) 





in (M18) to get Eq. (48b). 
(c)  Derivation of Eq. (48c): 
Derivation of Eq. (48c) follows the same logic as that for Eq. (48b). 
 
7.  Derivation of Eq. (52): 
Using Eqs. (40), (41a), (45a), (45b) and assuming that  0   , we have 
    
22
22 ,1
Fu F F s F F
F
m







   

.          ( M 2 0 )  








.  Using this fact and differentiating Eq. (M20) with respect to   give:  42
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 .             ( M 2 3 )  
Next, we use (a) the CRS properties of    ,
Ft Ft F TL S, (b) Eqs. (M1) and (M2) (to establish that 
tj l (j=H,F) is independent of m and   in the reduced model), and (c) Eq. (M4) and 
tH tF T SSS   to obtain an expression for 
tF S that depends only on 
tj l , 
T L , and 
T S .  This then 
yields: 
          ,1
,, 1 ,, 1
Ft F t H
F tF tF F tF tF F tF tF F tF tF
mm tF tH
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.    (M24) 
Using Eqs. (M23) and (M24), we have 














   
 











.        (M25) 
Using the Cobb-Douglas forms described in Eqs. (31), (50), and (51), and using Eqs. (M1) and 
(M2) to derive the expressions for 
tj l (j=H,F), we get Eq. (52).    
  
 